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This study examines the monetary model of exchange rate determination for five 
ASEAN countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand; and to estimate their exchange rate misalignments before the 1997 currency 
crisis. The validity of the monetary models; the relationship between exchange rates 
and macroeconomic fundamentals; the restoration of the long-run equilibrium 
exchange rates; and the out-of-sample forecasts of monetary model were examined 
using vector error-correction model. The results showed that the series used are 
stationary and cointegrated. The likelihood ratio tests cannot reject the structural 
identification of the implied cointegrating relation is the sticky-price monetary model 
for all five ASEAN countries but rejected almost all the flexible-price monetary 
model and the imposed restriction of proportionality between the exchange rate and 
relative money. The estimated long-run parameters for Indonesia and Singapore 
strongly support the theory of monetary models while the result for the Philippines 
provides weak support. However, the long-run coefficients for Malaysia and Thailand 
are inconsistent with the theory. The error-correction terms are significant and 
correctly signed. The speeds of adjustment are rapid in Indonesia and Thailand while 
the speeds for Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore are slower. Using the final 
parsimonious vector error-correction models, out-of-sample predictions for ASEAN 
five exchange rates are generated. The plotted actual and fitted exchange rates show 
that the models are able to track the actual exchange rate trend quiet well. The 
resulting residuals between the actual and the fitted values of exchange rate are the 
estimated misalignments. The results indicated that the Indonesia rupiah, Malaysian 
ringgit, Philippines peso and Singapore dollar were overvalued before the currency 
crisis while Thai baht was undervalued on the eve of the crisis. However, these five 
countries suffered modest misalignment. Therefore, little evidence of exchange 
misalignment is found to exist in 1997:Q2. In addition, the measure of the exchange 
rate valuation for ringgit Malaysia after imposing the pegging system shows that the 
RMAJSD exchange rate has been pegged at equilibrium level after the 
implementation of pegging RM3.80 to one US dollar. 
Abstrak thesis yang dikemukakan kepada Senat Universiti Putra Malaysia 
sebagai memenuhi keperluan untuk ijazah Doktor Falsafah 
PENENTUAN KADAR PERTUKARAN MENGGUNAKAN KAEDAH 
MONETARI DALAM LIMA NEGARA ASEAN 
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LEE CHIN 
Jun 2005 
Pengerusi : Profesor Madya Azali bin Mohamed, Ph.D. 
Fakulti : Ekonomi dan Pengurusan 
Kajian ini menguji model monetari bagi penentuan kadar pertukaran lima negara 
ASEAN, iaitu Indonesia, Malaysia, Filipina, Singapura, dan Thailand; dan 
menganggar pesongan kadar pertukaran mereha sebelum krisis kewangan tahun 1997. 
Pengesahan bagi model-model monetari; hubungan di antara kadar pertukaran dan 
asas makroekonomi; pemulihan keseimbangan kadar pertukaran jangka panjang; dan 
unjuran luar sampel dari model monetari diuji dengan menggunakan model vektor 
pembetulan ralat. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa siri-siri yang diuji adalah pegun 
dan berintegrasi. Ujian nisbah kemungkinan tidak dapat menolak pengenalan struktur 
bahawa hubungan integrasi adalah model monetari lekitan harga bagi kelima-lima 
negara ASEAN, tetapi menolak hampir semua model monetari harga-mudah-ubah dan 
kekangan nisbah persamaan di antara kadar pertukaran dan wang relatif. Angkubah- 
angkubah jangka panjang yang kami dapati bagi negara Indonesia dan Singapura 
menyokong teori model monetari, sedangkan penemuan bagi negara Filipina memberi 
sokongan yang lemah, tetapi penemuan bagi Malaysia dan Thailand bercanggah 
dengan teori. Pembolehubah-pembolehubah pembetulan ralat mempunyai tanda yang 
betul dan signifikan. Kelajuan perlarasan adalah pantas bagi negara Indonesia dan 
Thailand tetapi agak lambat bagi negara Malaysia, Filipina, dan Singapura. Dengan 
menggunakan model vektor pembetulan ralat yang teringkas, unjuran luar sampel 
untuk kadar pertukaran bagi lima negara ASEAN diperolehi. Lakaran-lakaran kadar 
pertukaran sebenar dan jangkaan menunjukkan bahawa model-model ini berupaya 
untuk mengesan tren kadar pertukaran. Baki antara kadar pertukaran sebenar dan 
jangkaan adalah anggaran pesongan bagi kadar pertukaran. Keputusan menunjukkan 
bahawa rupiah Indonesia, ringgit Malaysian, peso Filipina, dan dollar Singapura 
adalah lebih nilai sebelum krisis kewangan, manakala baht negara Thai pula kurang 
nilai. Walaubagaimanapun, lima negara ini hanya mengalami pesongan kadar 
pertukaran yang sederhana. Oleh itu, tiada bukti yang kukuh menunjukkan wujudnya 
pesongan kadar pertukaran pada 1997:Q2. Pengukuran nilai kadar pertukaran bagi 
ringgit Malaysia selepas perlaksanaan sistem kadar pertukaran tetap menunjukkan 
bahawa kadar pertukaran RM/USD berada pada paras keseimbangan selepas 
perlaksanaan sistem kadar pertukaran tetap RM3.80 kepada satu dollar US. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The word most commonly used by economists to describe the Southeast Asia's 
remarkable economic growth during the 1980s and early 1990s was "miracle". 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea and other countries in the region enjoyed 
rates of growth of nearly 8% a year, several times faster than those in the U.S. and 
many other Western industrialized nations. The "Asian miracle" was considered 
extraordinary because the region's rapid economic growth was accompanied by very 
little unemployment and no significant wealth gap between the rich and the poor. 
However, circumstances had dramatically changed in 1997. Since July 1997, 
Southeast Asia was gripped by an economic crisis of formidable proportions. At first, 
the economic crisis was limited to Thailand's financial sector, but it quickly grew to 
engulf Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea as well. The immediate trigger of 
Southeast Asia's current predicament was the devaluation of currencies in the region. 
The devaluation had eroded the value of Asian currencies, making it much more 
difficult for Asian businesses and banks to pay back debts that they owed in foreign 
denominations, such as the U.S. dollars. A wave of loan defaults resulted, and much 
of Asia's financial sector loomed toward bankruptcy. Unable to raise enough financial 
capital to fix their ailing economies, several Asian governments were forced to ask for 
international assistance. For Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea, help arrived in the 
form of loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a worldwide organization 
that seeks to maintain financial stability in the global economy. In return for those 
funds, recipient countries must implement a series of austerity measures designed to 
contain the crisis and improve their free-market economic policies. 
1.1.1 The Asian Miracle 
Economists have long marveled over the ability of countries in Southeast Asia to pick 
themselves up from dire poverty and become some of the strongest economies in the 
world. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)' countries have been 
among the fastest growing economies in the world. During 1970-96, the ASEAN 
economies grew by an average of 6.6% per annum (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998: p.4). 
Singapore recorded notable rates of growth averaging 8.5% per annum during the 
period of 1976-97, with the exception of the two recession years between 1985 and 
1986. And the real gross domestic product (GDP) of Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia had grown at an average rate of 7-8% during the late 1980's until the 
emergence of the currency crisis in mid 1997. Unlike the other four ASEAN 
countries, the Philippines did not record impressive GDP growth rates during the 
early 1990's due to major political and economic crisis. The economy was only 
picking up after 1993 with an annual growth of GDP averaged 4-5% during 1994-97. 
With the admission of Vietnam into ASEAN in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and 
later Cambodia in 1999, these transition economies have added another dimension to 
the ASEAN macroeconomic picture. Sharp rise in foreign direct investment inflows 
has stimulated their economic growth and brought significant transformation to these 
I The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in 
Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, 
Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. 
economies (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998: p.6). Output growth had moderated in 1996 
compared to 1995 for most ASEAN countries (Table 1. I). The average GDP growth 
rate in ASEAN declined from 7.3% in 1995 to 6.8% in 1996. However, the growth 
accelerated in Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines. Nevertheless, the GDP growth 
in the ASEAN region remained strong. 
Table 1.1: GDP Growth Rates (%) of ASEAN Countries, 1995-2003 
COUNTRY 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Brunei Darussalam 2.0 2.8 4.1 
Cambodia 
Indonesia 8.3 8.0 4.6 
Laos 
Malaysia 9.4 8.6 7.7 
Myanmar 
The Philippines 4.7 5.8 5.2 
Singapore 8.7 7.8 6.8 
Thailand 8.8 5.5 -0.4 
Vietnam 9.3 8.2 
ASEANa 7.0 6.8 5.2 
Note: a refers to the average growth rate. 
Source: ASEAN S e c r e t a r i a t ~ ~ b ) .  
1.1.2 Currency Crisis 
The impressive growth trajectory in the first half of the 1990's changed dramatically 
with the onset of the currency crisis. Massive attacks on the baht took place on 14 and 
15 May 1997, forcing the Bank of Thailand to sell dollars. Notwithstanding the huge 
amount of intervention to defend baht, the baht was forced to float on 2 July 1997. 
When the Thai baht came under speculative attack, the other Southeast Asian 
countries also experienced heavy selling pressure. The common reaction in the region 
to the difficulties is massive intervention by the central banks. The central bank of the 
Philippines used almost one billion U.S. dollars reserves within a few days without 
any positive results and thereafter allowed the peso to float on ! 1 h ! y  1997. i h e  
central bank of Malaysia spent an estimated USDl.5 billion before surrendered on 14 
July 1997. Indonesia rupiah also forced to float by market pressure on 14 August 
1997. Although the Singapore dollar was not subjected to strong speculative attacks, 
the regional currency and financial crisis had impaired but not collapsed the 
Singapore dollar. The Singapore dollar depreciated against the U.S. dollar but rose 
sharply against other Asian currencies. The transition economies had not been spared 
from the effects of the regional crisis. In 1998, the Laotion Kip fell by 70%. the 
Myanmar Kyat lowered by 50% and the Vietnamese Dong devalued by 15% 
compared to their July 1997 values. 
1.2 Issues 
Before the currency crisis, the ASEAN countries were among the fastest growing 
economies in the world, accompanied by low to moderate inflation and 
unemployment rates, rapid export growth, manageable external debt and improvement 
in current account deficits. During 1970-1996, the ASEAN economies grew by an 
average of 6.6% per annum (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998: p.4). As the economies 
experienced unprecedented growth in the last decade, the region also saw continuing 
development and liberalization in the financial system. After the total collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system in March 1973, the South East Asia countries then evolved 
into a generalized floating exchange rate system. Initially, some of theirs exchange 
rates were pegged to a single currency while others adopted a system of pegging to a 
basket of their trading partners' currencies. Still others preferred a managed float 
system. Before the onset of currency crisis, Indonesia and Brunei peg their currencies 
to US dollar and Singapore dollar, respectively. Meanwhile Malaysia, Thailand and 
Myanmar peg their currencies to a basket of their respective trading partners' 
currencies. While Singapore, Vietnam and Laos practised the managed float system 
and that the Philippines adopted an almost fixed nominal exchange rate regime. In 
pursuit of economic policies, most ASEAN countries placed a heavy reliance on the 
exchange rates, both as a means of maintaining international competitiveness and as 
an anchor for domestic prices. In doing so, different countries adopted variations of 
the flexible rate system in a way that real effective exchange rate would guide 
movements in the nominal exchange rate so that these two objectives are kept under 
constant check. Their outcomes, however, were diverse both in patterns and in 
magnitudes, and so are the characteristics of each individual ASEAN countries. 
The Southeast Asian currencies came under speculative pressure following the 
renewed attacks on the Thai baht beginning of May 1997. Following the abandonment 
of the baht-USD exchange rate peg on 2 July 1997; the contagion effects swept across 
the regional economies. The ringgit depreciated sharply and forced to float on 14 July 
1997 after valiant attempt by the central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), to 
defend it, while the Philippines peso was floated on 11 July 1997, followed by 
Indonesian ruppiah on 14 August 1997. Most Southeast Asian economies, which 
maintained fixed but adjustable exchange rates together with a fairly open capital 
account for the past decade (and longer in some cases) was not sustainable. Malaysia 
opted to close their capital accounts significantly while the other four major Southeast 
Asian economies have adopted floating regimes, albeit with some central bank 
smoothing interventions. Indonesia and Thailand were forced to float by market 
pressures in mid-1997. Subsequently they have adhered to this regime as part of the 
IMF agreement. On the other hand, the Philippines and Singapore have floated 
voluntarily. 
- -- 
The impact of the currency crisis has been more severe than anticipated. Substantial 
currency depreciations, sharp declines in equity prices, financial collapse, corporate 
bankruptcies, higher unemployment, increase in price levels, lower real household 
income and increased poverty levels have all lowered the growth prospects of 
ASEAN economies leading to recession in some countries. Thus, after the currency 
crisis, the economic growth of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia had contracted by as 
much as 6.5%, 10.2% and 13.6% respectively in 1998. The Philippines only 
experienced -0.4% of economic growth while Singapore, Brunei, Laos and Vietnam 
registered a sharp slowdown in economic growth in 1998. 
Many studies have tried to figure out the causes of Asian currency crisis, but the 
discussion has essentially centred around two broad approaches. The first is what is 
known as the "fundamentalist" view most notably advocated by Corsetti et al. (1998). 
This view suggests that the crisis was due to structural weaknesses prevalent in the 
domestic financial institutions together with unsound macroeconomic policies. And 
there were also some signs of vulnerability in the economies, such as current accounts 
deficit, overvalued exchange rates and a slowdown in export growth. The second view 
tells the story of a "financial panic", a view put forward by Radelet et al. (1998). This 
view emphasizes the role of expectations, panic and over adjustment in explaining the 
propagation of the crisis. The crisis was largely due to an abrupt change in investor 
expectations. 
It should be noted, however, that the two broad views on the origins of the crisis are 
by no means exclusive. There are issues, which both sides have agreed upon. It is 
agreed that the subsequent contagion effect that spread throughout the region was 
caused by panic and there were some fundamental concerns about the economies 
before the crisis. There is, therefore, yet to be an international consensus on the cause 
of the crisis. But it has become obvious that these economic fundamentals play an 
important role in this crisis. 
As recalled by former Governor of the Central Bank of Indonesia, Djiwandono 
(1998), the economic growth in recent years had been the result of less and less 
efficient investment financed partly by foreign capital. Piei and Ariff (1998) also 
underlined the fact that over the last few years the total factor productivity growth in 
Malaysia had fallen considerably, and even became negative in 1997, hence making 
the growth process progressively less sustainable. Whereas, in Thailand, a series of 
corporate failures, lack of rigour in the management and supervision of national 
financial systems, insufficient strictness on behalf of national authorities and the 
distortions created by the government had a certain responsibility in the crisis 
(Narongchai, 1998). 
One of the principal policy mistakes in the region, which is highlighted by a few 
observers (Hill, 1998; Nidhiprabha, 1998; Sadli, 1998 and Athukorala, 1998), was the 
commitment to a rigidly fixed exchange rate or quasi-fixed exchange rates. For 
example, Indonesia pegged to a single currency, the U.S. dollar, while others pegged 
to a basket of currencies, in which the effective weight of the U.S. dollar in the basket 
was so high that it could be characterized as an implicit peg to the U.S. currency. 
They were hoping that the pegged to the value of the U.S. dollar would help to ensure 
its stability, however, in recent years, a robust U.S. economy had strengthened the 
dollar which had led many investors to believe that these currencies were overvalued. 
